III.   Aristotle's "Forms of Democracy"

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I. How Many Forms of Democracy?

"Five" Democracies. "At present, some people think that there is but one kind of democracy and one kind of oligarchy; but this is not true." This remark by Aristotle in Book 4 of his *Politics* (1289A, 8–10) leads to a discussion in which certain forms or types of some constitutions including democracy are distinguished. Forms of democracy are reexamined in Book 6.[1]

In the first passage where he divides democracy into its forms (1291B, 30–1292A, 37), he recognizes five types, beginning with a form in which rich and poor live together in harmony and ending with a radical form in which the *dêmos* seizes authority. After an analysis of four forms of oligarchy, he adds (1292B, 11–21) that sometimes a state may be administered democratically even though its constitution is not democratic, and conversely.

"Four" Democracies. Aristotle now (1292B, 25–1293A, 10) describes four forms, which correspond closely to the second, third, fourth and fifth of the preceding classification. The two passages analyzing forms of democracy leave it, at first, uncertain whether Aristotle meant to recognize five or four such forms. Fortunately, his explicit reference to "the four kinds of democracy" at 1318B, 6 reveals that he regarded four as the proper number.

The Discrepancy Explained. It remains to account for the one passage (1291B, 30 ff.) in which five forms are admitted.[2] The most economical explanation is that of Newman.[3] The first of

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[1] This paper is based on a book by James Day and the present writer, *Aristotle's History of Athenian Democracy*, to be published by the University of California Press.

[2] One explanation, that of Sir Ernest Barker in his annotated translation, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford 1946) 170, must be excluded. He suggests that Aristotle is using different criteria in the two classifications: "political structure" in the fivefold analysis and "social composition" in the fourfold one. Actually, however, the main criterion is the same in both classifications: which people may hold office and share in running the state?

[3] *The Politics of Aristotle* 4 (London 1902) xxxvi. His suggestion is accepted by W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*[5] (London 1949) 258, note 2.

the "five" forms is not referred to in the succeeding discussion because the first two of the "five" are silently merged and become the first of the "four" in the fourfold analysis. This suggestion may be strengthened by the recent observation of Raymond Weil.[4] The first of the "five," in which the wealthy and the poor cooperate, could not be more than a purely abstract form and was unlikely to exist anywhere; this idealistic first form is tacitly dropped.[5] A choice between possible explanations is less important than the recognition of the fact that Aristotle's final number of democratic forms is four.   We now need to ask what he did with this doctrine.

II. The Doctrine in Application

The "Reality" of the Doctrine.   It might be suggested that the doctrine was a purely speculative theory; if Aristotle was talking only about "forms of democracy" in some ideal world, inspection of his view would be somewhat baffled.   But Aristotle evidently regarded the scheme as applicable.   It assumes a position in relation to history with the arrangement of the forms in chronological order.   The use of historical examples here and there[6] confirms the fact that he was talking about real states.   Historical criteria are therefore relevant.   Transition from first to fourth democracy is possible, although Aristotle nowhere refers to it as inevitable.   And since it was unlikely that the fourth form would precede the first, it is called not only τέταρτον (in order of description) but also τελευταία (1319B, 1).

The Athênaiôn politeia; *Its Authorship.*   The obvious place to look for application of the scheme is the *Athênaiôn politeia (AP)*.   But since several scholars have held that this text is not by Aristotle, a brief commitment about the authorship is needed.   The main argument against the notion that Aristotle wrote the *AP* is the apparent difference between the quality of this text and that of such works as the *Ethics* and the *Physics*.   This point of view

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[4] *Aristote et l'histoire* (Paris 1960) 38–39, 354.

[5] Emendation has also been tried.   Immisch, in his 1929 Teubner text, and Rackham, in the Loeb edition, follow Schlosser in deleting the words ἄλλο δέ at 1291B, 39.   The exclusion of these words would leave only four forms of democracy in the first classification; but the obvious objections against resolving contradictions through emendation require this to be a last resort.

[6] E.g. in the discussion of radicalism at 1319B, 1–32.   Further evidence is assembled and discussed by R. Weil (above, note 4) *passim*.

has been restated by C. Hignett in his work on the Athenian constitution, where he appeals to

> the supreme difficulty, the immeasurable superiority of the *Politics* to the *Athenaion Politeia* in breadth of treatment and soundness of judgement. The data used by Aristotle in the *Politics* may not always be correct, but the way in which he handles them is masterly, and the value of his generalizations is not affected by the faulty character of some of his instances.[7]

But this supreme difficulty is not insuperable. Breadth of treatment is clearly more suited to the *Politics* than to a historical treatise as concise as the *AP*; and Aristotle's soundness of judgment has not (as Hignett concedes) excluded factual errors from the *Politics*. Logically, then, the *AP* might be a brief collection of such errors, organized in a chronological narrative rather than as support for generalizations. And given the facts that the *AP* was written during Aristotle's lifetime and that he is known to have supervised the collecting of *politeiai* in the Lyceum, ancient quotations ascribing it to him seem satisfactory evidence that he wrote it; nor can we, as Hignett recommends, simply disregard the ancient attribution. Any elucidation of Aristotelian doctrines in the text would further strengthen the case for authenticity.[8]

The Metabolai *of Democracy.* To return from the digression, at the end of the historical survey in the *AP* (§41), Aristotle summarizes the progress of Athenian democracy. He asserts that the constitution passed through eleven changes (*metabolai*) in reaching its condition in 403/2, which condition according to Aristotle persisted down to his own day.[9] The eleven *metabolai* are:

1. The change from the original political arrangements, made when Ion and his associates immigrated.

2. The change in the time of Theseus, "leaning a bit away from monarchy."

The change in the time of Draco.[10]

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[7] *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford 1952) 29.

[8] Unless one suggests the undiscussable hypothesis that its similarities to other works by Aristotle are due to unusually pedantic imitation by a "pupil."

[9] *AP* 41.2. Aristotle's view that the constitution had not changed between 403 and his time is something of an overstatement, but we are concerned here with *his* opinion.

[10] I accept the widely held opinion that this arrangement, described in §4, is unhistorical (it is sufficient to refer to G. Busolt's *Griechische Staatskunde* 1 [Munich 1920] 52–58). The reference to the *metastasis* here is evidently an interpolation into a

3. The change (or "constitution"?[11]) in the time of Solon, from which democracy took its beginning.

4. The tyranny of Pisistratus.

5. The constitution ("change"?) of Cleisthenes, more democratic[12] than Solon's.

6. The one after the Persian Wars, in which the Areopagus dominated.

7. The one pointed to by Aristides and fulfilled by Ephialtes.

8. The establishment of the Four Hundred (411 B.C.)

9. Democracy again (410).

10. The tyranny of the Thirty and the Ten (404–3).

11. The restored democracy (403 and following).

Forms of Democracy in the AP.   The first two stages in this list were monarchic, although the second is said to have deviated a little from monarchy.   Beginning with the third *metastasis*, forms of democracy appear.   The third, fifth, sixth and seventh changes in fact brought forth democratic constitutions.   The eighth and tenth changes led to brief oligarchies, and the restored democracy succeeding each of them was only the preceding form, i.e. the seventh, returning without alteration.   Thus the ninth and eleventh forms are not different kinds of constitution.   It is obvious that five and seven would be accounted democratic forms by Aristotle; but a further word is needed about three and six.

text first composed without it, as is also §4; see U. Wilcken, *XLVII Versammlung deutscher Philologen u. Schulmänner, Apophoreton überreicht von der Graeca Halensis* (Berlin 1903) 85–98.   Wilcken allowed the authenticity of the first and last sentences of §4 and transferred the first 15 words of the second sentence to stand between §1 and §2. But A. Ledl argued convincingly for the expulsion of §4 entire: *Studien zur älteren athenischen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Heidelberg 1914) 8.   Wilcken also denied that Aristotle could have been the interpolator of §4, but nothing really bars this possibility: A. Fuks, *The Ancestral Constitution* (London 1953) 97.

[11] It is uncertain whether Aristotle intended *metastasis* or *politeia* to be understood with τρίτη δ' ἡ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν ἡ ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο. The same problem occurs elsewhere in the series.   For example, the fifth item is referred to as πέμπτη δ' ἡ μετὰ ⟨τὴν⟩ τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἡ Κλεισθένους, δημοτικωτέρα τῆς Σόλωνος, and a comparison of these words with those at 22.1, δημοτικωτέρα πολὺ τῆς Σόλωνος ἐγένετο ἡ πολιτεία, suggests that the understood noun may well be *politeia*.   Whether we understand *metastasis* or *politeia* in the third entry in the list, *AP* 7.1 shows that Aristotle believed that Solon had made a *politeia*.

[12] δημοτικός, here used in the comparative, need not mean "democratic" in the strict constitutional sense but can mean "on the side of the lower orders."   See G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *Historia* 3 (1954/5) 23.   But the meaning "democratic" is not excluded.   At *Pol.* 1299B, 31–32, Aristotle seems to use δημοκρατικός and δημοτικός synonymously.

To lay aside for the moment the question whether they were in fact democratic, did he consider them democratic?

At 7.1 Aristotle says that Solon "founded a *politeia* and made other laws."[13]   The constitution is said (8.4) to have included a *boulê* of four hundred.   The *boulê* was the distinctive sign of democracy, as Aristotle observes in the *Politics* (1299B, 30 ff.).   He remarks that some offices are peculiar to certain kinds of constitution and assigns a *boulê* to democracy especially.   The presence of a *boulê* in the Solonian constitution would sufficiently define that constitution as a form of democracy.

Likewise, Solon is said (8.1) to have inaugurated the appointment of magistrates by allotment from a preselected group. Aristotle considered such a method of election a combination of democratic and oligarchic elements (*Pol.* 1266A, 8–9); this would be a mildly democratic feature, suitable to the first and least radical form of democracy.   Finally, he describes Solon's constitution in 41.2 as the one ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο: certain seminal usages of democracy had their origin here.   The constitution was a form of (at least incipient) democracy.[14]

Further in the list at 41.2 is the sixth stage, in the period after the Persian Wars, when the Areopagus was allegedly in charge of the state.   In the text (25.1) this arrangement is said to have endured for seventeen years (viz. 479–462).   Did Aristotle also consider this a form of democracy?   Clearly so.   He had already recorded the (according to him, restored) allotment of archons, beginning in 487/6, from a preselected group (22.5).   He relates no suspension of this method of appointing officers, nor was the *boulê* dissolved.   Whatever we think of the possible historical reality of this form, we may assume that Aristotle regarded it as democratic.

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[13] That is, other than the laws comprising his *politeia*. Aristotle indicates his distinction between *nomoi* and *politeia* at *Pol.* 1273B, 34 and 1274B, 15,18 (Draco and Pittacus made *nomoi* but not a *politeia*).   It is likely that the distinction *nomoi/politeia* was sharpened by political theorists of the fourth century (it may exist at Antiphon 3.1.1).   In Solon's day there may well have been no such distinction.

[14] Solon's legislation on civil rights (cancellation of debts and emancipation of the enslaved, *AP* 12.4) may not have seemed features of democracy as contrasted with other constitutions; nor can the reforms of *AP* 9 and 10 prove that Aristotle thought of the constitution as democratic in the technical sense, unless he meant to indicate true popular courts with his word *dikastêrion* at 9.1.   But this term is anachronistic, and perhaps he meant that Solon confirmed the right of appeal to the older Heliaea: R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, *Administration of Justice* 1 (Chicago 1930) 153.

Therefore, Aristotle's summary of the historical portion of the *AP* registers four democratic arrangements in the Athenian state down to 403 (and, further, down to his own day; for he viewed the restored democracy in 403 as the last in the series of stages). The *Politics* also knows four forms, and no more, of democracy (section 1 *supra*). It is an immediate working hypothesis that the *Politics* and the *AP* share a common doctrine or method: the *AP* attempts to illustrate from Athenian history the dogma laid down in the *Politics* for states generally. This hypothesis is somewhat strengthened by literary chronology. No passage in the *Politics* can be shown to have been written later than 335;[15] the *AP* was not written before *ca.* 327.[16] So far as such dates suggest anything, it is that the *AP* was written with the doctrines of the *Politics* already formulated and available for guidance.

Aristotle's Sources. Before examining the hypothesis just mentioned, we might ask whether Aristotle could have found the facts of Athenian history already arranged in four forms of democracy by his sources. If this were believed, there would be no necessary connection between the *Politics* and the *AP* in respect of this scheme.

He used a few original sources in the *AP*, such as documents quoted or paraphrased at 8.3, 16.10, 29.2-3, 39, and the notoriously baffling 30-31. He used poems of Solon in 5 and 12; he cites Herodotus at 14.4; the last sentence of 33 is little more than a paraphrase of Thucydides 8.97.2 *fin.*; Theopompus, who criticized democratic statesmen, may have been used here and there for scandalous tales (6.2, 9.2, 25.3, 28.3); Ephorus was probably ignored.[17] The main sources were the *Atthides* of Cleidemus and

[15] The latest event unambiguously referred to is the murder of Philip II in 336 (1311b, 1-2). Aristotle refers to Thebes as if it had not yet been destroyed in 335 (1321a, 26-29). These *termini* were established by B. Keil, *Die solonische Verfassung*, etc. (Berlin 1892) 122-23. Other passages have been conjecturally referred to events slightly later than 335: see Newman's commentary, 2 (1887) 333, 360; 4 (1902) 255, 439. But these references are not sufficiently clear to justify lowering Keil's date by any significant interval. There is no need to lower the date of *Pol.* 4-6 to correspond with that of the *AP* (see note 16) on the ground that the knowledge of Athens in those books presupposes that the *AP* was written or being written; for this suggestion, W. Theiler, *Mus. Helv.* 9 (1952) 74-77.

[16] *AP* 54.4 was not written before 326/5: B. D. Meritt, *AJP* 61 (1940) 78. If we allow Aristotle some months to reach chapter 54, we might assume that he began to work on the text in about 327.

[17] Against Ephorus: Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893) 1.304-5; Jacoby, *FGrHist* Suppl. 2 (1954) 53, note 34. Their views seem secure despite R. Werner's recent nomination of Ephorus, *Athenaeum* 36, n.s., (1958) 48-89.

especially of Androtion. This view of the sources is universally accepted; it would be affectation to parade evidence as if something new were being proved.[18] Nowhere in these possible sources is Aristotle likely to have met a doctrine arguing that there had been four stages of democracy in the Athenian constitution. We may therefore, with considerable safety, assign this doctrine to him until citations from *Atthides* can be shown to prove otherwise.[19]

III. THE DOCTRINE TESTED

The Risks of a Scheme. The four democratic forms in the *AP* proceed from the first (most moderate) to the last (most radical). Their similarity to the forms as described in *Politics* 4–6 suggests that Aristotle sought to exemplify in fact the constitutions known in theory. But if Athenian democracy actually did pass through the four forms enumerated, nothing could be said against the scheme. This is another way of asking whether his forms of democracy were inescapably imposed on him by objective study of history. Criticism could be valid only if it were seen that he distorted or overlooked facts; and, if this were seen, certain conclusions would be enforced on historians who wish to use the *AP* as a source. It is not possible here to test Aristotle's entire narrative, but the fourfold pattern of democracy may be summarily examined.

Solon's "Democracy." It is striking that the portrait of Solon in the *AP* is different from that in the *Politics* (1273B, 35 ff.).[20] In the *Politics* Solon is said to have made a constitution, but Aristotle's main purpose is to shield him from accusations of being too radical. His real desire is said to have been the creation of a mixed constitution, by combining oligarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements (respectively the Areopagus, elected magis-

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[18] A judicious statement of the usual estimate of the sources is given by Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford 1949) 235, note 36.

[19] We must also refuse to play the game of inventing unknown sources. It was formerly customary to postulate an "oligarchic party pamphlet" as a source here and there. But this *Parteischrift* was usually invoked by way of special pleading. When Aristotle was found wrong he was said to have followed the pamphlet, and when right he was said to have spurned it in favor of better sources. The *AP* can be accounted for without presupposing phantom authors.

[20] Some scholars have, unnecessarily, considered this passage of the *Politics* (2.12) wholly or partly spurious, but even Newman in his commentary, 2 (1887) 373, 377 allows the authenticity of the remarks on Solon.

trates, and popular courts). He made no change in the council (of the Areopagus) nor in the method of choosing officers. Any corruption of his institutions toward democracy had come about by accident, not by the fulfillment of his plans.

In the *AP*, however, the version of his work is only partly the same; the emphasis has changed significantly. From the conservative designer of a mixed constitution he has become the founder of a more clearly democratic form. The two essential differences are his founding of a *boulê* of four hundred in addition to the Areopagus (8.4) and his introduction of mixed sortition to choose magistrates (8.1). With this last statement especially, Aristotle contradicts his earlier report in the *Politics*, viz. that Solon made no change in the election of officers. Some scholars have tried to explain this contradiction on the assumption that Aristotle or his pupils found better evidence about Solon before the *AP* was written;[21] it might be suggested that the *axones*, which are known to have recorded Solonian laws, were consulted.[22]

If Aristotle did base his account in the *AP* on further study of documents, the statements in the *Politics* could be dismissed, and the contradiction between the two works would be innocuous. It is therefore very important to observe that there is *no sign whatever in the text* suggesting that documents coming directly or indirectly from the sixth century instructed Aristotle concerning Solon. As to the *axones*, it is not even clear that Aristotle had heard of them: he says that Solon's laws were inscribed on "the *kyrbeis*" (7.1).[23] Nor do his statements appear so clearly convincing that a documentary basis must be presupposed even though no documents are cited.

On the matter of the *boulê* of four hundred, his words are unusually abrupt: "He made a *boulê* of four hundred, one hundred from each tribe." There is no evidence given, even though Aristotle took care to cite evidence for Solon's installation of the

[21] For example, H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford 1958) 197, note 2.

[22] Plutarch (*Solon* 25) records an ancient opinion that the *axones* contained secular law and the *kyrbeis* religious. This view has now been sponsored, with evidence, by S. Dow, *Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc.* 71 (1953–57) 30–31.

[23] There was an alleged work of Aristotle, *On the Axones of Solon*, about which we know nothing but the title; for discussion, R. Weil (above, note 4) 125–27. Any suggestion that Aristotle used *axones* for the *AP* must be tested against the text of the *AP* itself.

lot (8.1); and, as one scholar who accepts this *boulê* has said, "Aristotle omits to mention the Lower Boule's functions." The text of the *AP* does not show that Aristotle had evidence guaranteeing the existence of this *boulê*, and it need not be a principle of scholarship that one must accept it because there is fourth century evidence for it and nowhere a specific statement against it.

The historicity of Solon's *boulê* remains highly controversial. Perhaps all that one can do is to state his position.[24] It has already been noted that Aristotle did not cite whatever evidence he may have possessed. The evidence outside Aristotle is inconclusive. Cleomenes of Sparta tried to dissolve "the council" (Hdt. 5.72.1–2); but this is proof only to the convinced, for the council in question may be the Areopagus.[25] The fact that Chios had a *boulê* during the sixth century does not prove that Athens had a lower council.[26] The creation of a council of four hundred by the oligarchs in 411 (Thuc. 8.67.3) does not establish a Solonian *boulê*, even though someone described a council of four hundred as being according to ancestral custom (*AP* 31.1). Finally, there is the passage in Plutarch (*Solon* 19) comparing the two councils to two anchors. It has been thought that this comparison comes from a poem of Solon and thus guarantees the lower council of Solon.[27] But Plutarch does not quote this as from a poem of Solon, and we cannot exclude the possibility that the likeness was his own.[28]

[24] B. Niese first attacked the Solonian *boulê*, *Hist. Zeitschr.* 69 (1892) 65–66. He was followed by K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* 1². 1. 366, note 2; De Sanctis, *Atthis*² (Torino 1912) 251; Hignett (above, note 7) 92–96, whom Jacoby tentatively followed, *FGrHist* Suppl. 2 (1954) 530, after having earlier accepted the *boulê*, *ibid*. 107, note 25. See, as the latest critic, R. Sealey, *Historia* 9 (1960) 160–61. Many scholars have accepted the *boulê*, including especially Busolt in his *Griechische Geschichte* 2². 279, and in Busolt-Swoboda (above, note 10) 2.845, where a summary of the literature down to 1926 will be found. The present state of the question is carefully summarized by A. Masaracchia, *Solone* (Florence 1958) 158–63.

[25] A possibility suggested by Hignett (above, note 7) 94, and by Sealey (above, note 24) 160, note 35.

[26] The Chiot *boulê* appears on the famous inscription re-edited by L. Jeffery, *BSA* 51 (1956) 157–67, who dates the stone 575–550 B.C. The text was further studied by J. H. Oliver, *AJP* 80 (1959) 296–301.

[27] Suggested by K. Freeman, *The Work and Life of Solon* (Cardiff 1926) 79; Wade-Gery (above, note 21) 146, note 2; F. Stähelin, *Hermes* 68 (1933) 343–45; Masaracchia (above, note 24) 160–61.

[28] Among those not accepting the inference from the passage in Plutarch are Hignett (above, note 7) 93; Jacoby (above, note 24) 107, note 25; Sealey (above, note 24) 160, who suggests that the likeness may have been expressed by Solon but may not have been applied to two councils.

Various attempts have been made to suggest the function of the lower council or Solon's motivation in founding it.[29]   To different readers, these conjectures may or may not seem plausible.   But the issue is not whether we can imagine reasons for founding a lower council but whether Aristotle is right and had evidence for his view.   In the poems of Solon that *are* quoted by Aristotle and Plutarch there is no reference to a change in the constitution.   A tenable analogy with the Spartan *gerousia* suggests that the Areopagus had probouleutic powers until a lower council was founded.   Just as we can (if we choose) infer reasons for a *boulê* in the early sixth century, we can also supply reasons why Solon may have seen no need for it.   The ease with which later institutions were assigned to him may serve as a useful warning against accepting this lower council without better evidence than we have. In sum, the writer has grave doubts about the authenticity of this *boulê*, but it seems safest to avoid a categorical denial that Solon created it.[30]

Aristotle's statement about mixed sortition of magistrates is even less acceptable, because in trying to support it he shows how little he really knew about such a reform.   He attempts to confirm his allegation by arguing backward from a law in use in the fourth century.[31]   This was a highly unnecessary procedure if he really had *axones*, or other documents, or informative Solonian poems before him.   The law in question prescribes allotment of *tamiai* from the highest property class.   This law shows that *tamiai* were so chosen in the fourth century; it does not show that archons were chosen by this means in the sixth.   Nor is it historically plausible that archons were appointed by even mixed sortition early in the sixth century.[32]   Solonian allotment of officers is therefore to be rejected.

But (it will be asked) if no good sources guaranteed these

[29] For example, by F. E. Adcock, *CAH* 4.54; Wade-Gery (above, note 21) 146; A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London 1956) 88–89; Masaracchia (above, note 24) 162–63; A. R. Burn, *The Lyric Age of Greece* (London 1960) 299–300; J. H. Oliver, *Demokratia, the Gods, and the Free World* (Baltimore 1960) 59–60; H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*[2] (Munich 1960) 122.

[30] This is roughly the position of C. Gilliard, *Quelques réformes de Solon* (Lausanne 1907) 282–84.

[31] Aristotle's inference from the law about *tamiai* is convincingly refuted by F. E. Adcock, *CAH* 4.51.   Most recently, Masaracchia (above, note 24) 156–58, and Bengtson (above, note 29) 122 have also rejected the alleged Solonian method of allotment.

[32] Adcock, *loc. cit.* (above, note 31).

reforms, why did Aristotle thus alter his portrait of Solon given in Book 2 of the *Politics*? The answer is that Aristotle's political theory had now reached the stage represented by *Politics* 4–6. Democracy was no longer viewed as a single constitution beside oligarchy, aristocracy, and the others noticed in Book 3 (1279A, 22 ff.). Further speculation had discovered four forms of democracy. It was now preferred to conceive Solon as the creator of the first of these forms; and since a *boulê* and allotment were essential to democracy (especially in Aristotle's time), Aristotle accepted from someone else—or inferred by himself—the view that these features of democracy originated in Solon's reforms. The first and least radical form was thus reconstructed, with corresponding adjustment of historical fact.

Cleisthenes' Reforms. The second form, established by Cleisthenes, receives a full analysis in chapter 21. Since Aristotle lived under the Cleisthenic system of ten tribes, he could give a solid description of the complex arrangement by which demes were organized into *trittyes* and these into tribes. The chapter is therefore one of the most valuable in the *AP*. The major reservations that it evokes concern the motivations assigned by Aristotle to Cleisthenes. No documents told Aristotle why Cleisthenes had made his reforms,[33] and in deducing his motives Aristotle has not been entirely successful. For example, Cleisthenes is said (21.4) to have made people living in demes "fellow-demesmen." Why? "So that they would not, by addressing people by their fathers' names, expose the new citizens, but would designate them by their demes; and this is why Athenians call themselves by their demes." Yet at 63.4 Aristotle records that each Athenian juror bears a ticket showing his name, his *father's* name, and so on. Inscriptions also prove decisively that Athenians did not use demotic names to the exclusion of patronymics; nor did Aristotle discover this motivation explained in a copy of the Cleisthenic laws. He believed, however, that Cleisthenes had distributed citizens into ten tribes "so that more people could share in citizenship" (21.2).[34] He had also expressed an opinion, in the *Politics*

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[33] Herodotus, writing much earlier, also did not know why Cleisthenes had formed ten tribes. He inferred (absurdly) that he did so in imitation of his maternal grandfather, who had changed the names of the tribes at Sicyon: 5.67.1.

[34] ὅπως μετάσχωσι πλείους τῆς πολιτείας. F. R. Wüst, *Historia* 6 (1957) 184–85, would translate μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας "take part in the administration."

(1275B, 36–37), that Cleisthenes had enfranchised many new citizens, a deed of which Herodotus says nothing.[35]   Whether or not Cleisthenes did create new citizens, it is unnecessary to suppose, with Aristotle, that integration of these citizens was the main motive of his reforms.[36]   Despite such wrong inferences by Aristotle, it is certain that Cleisthenes established *dêmokratia* (whether or not so called at the time[37]), and much of chapter 21 is unassailable.

The Areopagite Domination.   The third form of democracy (sixth in the list at 41.2) is the domination allegedly exercised by the Areopagus from 479 to 462.   Nowhere in other sources do we find any hint of such a domination.   Aristotle, aware of the problem of demonstrating that this political order ever existed, was constrained to say that the Areopagus took over leadership "by no decree, but because it was responsible for the naval victory at Salamis" (23.1).   But not even this elusive explanation suffices.   In the first place, the accompanying anecdote—to the effect that the Areopagus provided money for the sailors at Salamis—is told by Cleidemus (*FGrHist* 323, F 21) as if Themistocles, not the Areopagus, provided the money.   Androtion was probably Aristotle's source and, if so, one Atthidographer tends to balance another, and the anecdote can scarcely be accepted without suspicion.   Again, when Aristotle has a different case to argue, he can say that the people (not the Areopagus) were responsible for the victory of Salamis and used their new prestige to make the state more democratic (*Pol.* 1304A, 22–24).   The evidence is not firm but plastic.   Nor does Aristotle cite any clear

The words can have this meaning, e.g. at *Pol.* 1292A, 41; B,39.   But they can also mean "share in citizenship," e.g. at *AP* 42.1 or *Pol.* 1275B, 31–32, where Aristotle is discussing the question, Who is a citizen?

[35] I follow *LSJ*, as well as editors and commentators, in translating ἐφυλέτευσε "admitted into the tribes"; φυλετεύω ought to mean "make one a φυλέτης." J. H. Oliver, *Historia* 9 (1960) 503, translates the aorist "formed into a separate φυλή (class or category)." If Oliver is right, then *AP* 21.2 and 21.4 (note τοὺς νεοπολίτας) are the only passages where Aristotle ascribes to Cleisthenes the wish to introduce new citizens into the community.

[36] Grave doubt has been cast on the alleged enfranchisements by historians.   See Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* 2². 409 and note 5; Wade-Gery (above, note 21) 148–50 (enfranchisements, if any, were few); De Sanctis (above, note 24) 337 (the enfranchisements may be an oligarchic invention); Jacoby, *FGrHist* Suppl. 1 (1954) 159.

[37] The fairly late use of the term *dêmokratia* was pointed out by J. A. O. Larsen, *Essays . . . Presented to George H. Sabine* (Ithaca 1948) 13–16.   See also his *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1955) 15.

constitutional innovation under this arrangement. The lack of substance in this form of democracy makes it important to ask why Aristotle awards it a place in his list.

To reconstruct the third form of democracy, Aristotle seems to have reasoned backward from the inauguration of the fourth and last form, the stage achieved by Ephialtes in 462 (25.2). Aristotle did not know precisely what Ephialtes had done in that year. He speaks of the removal of "the additional powers through which the Areopagus was the guardian of the constitution," and of the redistribution of these "additional" powers to the *boulê*, the assembly, and the courts.[38] He evidently did not know what powers had been removed, but he believed that the reforms of 462 represented the final crumbling of conservative institutions in Athens. After 462, the three democratic elements—*boulê*, assembly and dicasteries—grew continuously in power. Since they presumably received a sudden access of authority in 462, it must have been to them that Ephialtes redistributed whatever competence he took from the Areopagus. The result of this reasoning appears at 25.2.

But if Ephialtes attacked the Areopagus and thus inaugurated radicalism, as Aristotle says, his constitution evidently followed some stage in which the Areopagus had been especially prominent. And since the Cleisthenic *politeia* gave no special post of leadership to the Areopagus, Aristotle could reason that some change between the time of Cleisthenes and that of Ephialtes had led to an Areopagite domination. The end of this domination was fixed for Aristotle in 462. Its beginning was inferred from the anecdote about the Areopagus and the money for sailors at Salamis; the origin of the Areopagite primacy was placed in 479. Thus at 25.1 Aristotle could say that the constitution was directed by the Areopagus for seventeen years; and at 42.1 the Areopagite primacy could be listed as the third form of Athenian democracy.

Yet a more likely view of Ephialtes' reforms is that they concerned judicial matters. Perhaps he left the Areopagus in charge only of murder trials and certain other restricted cases.[39] To this degree he might be said to have attacked the Areopagus, but to say with Aristotle that he "destroyed" it (41.2) is unnecessary.

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[38] For an attempt to explain these "additional" powers, cf. V. L. Johnson, *AJP* 58 (1937) 334–41.

[39] Hignett (above, note 7) 199.

Along with this reform went another of at least equal importance: the establishment of the popular court or dicastery (perhaps it was still called the Heliaea) as the court of first instance rather than as a court of appeal.[40]   His reforms were a landmark in juridical history, but they destroyed no constitution.   Nor did the Areopagus probably have any powers that could then be assigned to the assembly.

Only by following Aristotle in his apparent exaggeration of the Ephialtic reforms could we believe in an Areopagite constitution. And within the period of the domination Aristotle is not well informed, a fact tending to increase our suspicion of the Areopagite primacy.   He narrates (AP 24) the story—universally rejected, and rightly so[41]—of Aristides "advising" the people to move into the city, where they would be supported on public revenues.   Accompanying this tale are massive anachronisms, such as the assertion that six thousand jurors were so supported; Aristotle himself refutes this statement at 27.3, where he says that Pericles installed dicastic pay.[42]   The third form of democracy is the least convincing of the four that comprise Aristotle's scheme.

Radicalism.   The description of Aristotle's fourth form, after 462 (§26 ff.), offers problems mainly of interpretation.   No one would deny that Athenian democracy became radical.   But when did this period begin: in 462 with the Ephialtic reforms, or after 450 with the supremacy of Pericles, or after 429 with his death and the rise of his political successors?   Again, we may well doubt whether Aristotle had good evidence for his belief that Pericles installed dicastic pay "in demagogic competition with the liberality of Kimon" (27.3).   This remark may be nothing more than a fourth century slander against Pericles, possibly coming from Theopompus.   Nevertheless, a good case could be made out for 462 as the beginning of more popular direction of affairs. If we wish to divide the history of the constitution into stages, Aristotle's recognition of a new stage beginning then does no great violence to fact.

[40] Wade-Gery (above, note 21) 195–97.

[41] See, for example, Wilamowitz (above, note 17) 1.159.

[42] The anachronisms in 24.3 might be partly excused if we assume that Aristotle was referring to a process that developed over several decades.   The suggestion that Aristides advised immigration to the city remains unsupported.   The modern attempt to harmonize the evidence, by conjecturing that Aristides proposed dicastic pay and Pericles established it, may be held unnecessary: see *OCD*, s.v. "Dicasteries," page 275B.

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A History of Democracy. But the scheme remains somewhat unsatisfactory. An equally plausible view of Athenian political history could be severely simplified as follows. The constitutional reforms ascribed to Solon are far less well attested than are his cancellation of debts and economic measures, such as his prohibition against the export of agricultural products with exception of olive oil, a law credibly reported by Plutarch (*Solon* 24) from the first *axôn*. Solon probably left the constitution much as he found it, and the *Politics* is right in saying that he changed nothing in the mode of electing officers. The essential reform of the constitution was made by Cleisthenes: with the administration of public business by the *boulê* of five hundred the people became literally the masters of their own policy. And this democratic constitution continued in force through the fifth and fourth centuries (except for temporary oligarchic interruptions). The major trend was toward more and more popular control of affairs. Within this trend the reforms of Ephialtes are indeed a landmark in judicial, not constitutional, history; they did not destroy a previous political supremacy held by the Areopagus. It is unnecessary and misleading to try to detect four successively more radical forms of democracy within this series of events.

IV. POLITICAL TELEOLOGY

Metabolai in Aristotle. Why did Aristotle base his survey of constitutional history (1–41) on a system of *metabolai*, if these were not really needed to account for events? He does not explain his reasons for postulating these eleven "changes"; but by observation of his thought elsewhere the answer can be found. To conceive entities (especially animals) as developing through certain stages toward a certain end is supremely characteristic of his thought. Nature will, if possible, assist a creature to attain its final developed form or *telos*.[43] Likewise, the various parts of animals all have their distinctive purpose: for example, man was given the voice in order to be made to live in political communities and thus achieve his true nature (*Pol.*1253A, 9 ff.).

Such teleological explanations are especially appropriate to

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[43] The best account of Aristotle's teleology is in the great book of R. Eucken, *Die Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung* (Berlin 1872) 67–121. See also G. Boas, *Some Assumptions of Aristotle* (Philadelphia 1959) 50–55.

biology, but Aristotle did not restrict them to that science. He found use for teleology in fields where a modern philosopher might not apply it. By a bold transference of method, the art of tragedy was described in the *Poetics* (1449A, 14–15) as having passed through stages on the way to its final form: "Tragedy, having passed through many changes (πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα), halted when it attained its true nature." Its development was evolutionary; since the causes of poetry are "natural,"[44] the propulsive force behind tragedy's evolution will have been nature.

Aristotle also regarded the state as a natural entity. He says, "Every state exists by nature" (*Pol.* 1252B, 30); and such indeed is the main theme of the first book of the *Politics*. If the state, like poetry, is natural, then it could also have *metabolai* that would have obvious analogies with those found elsewhere in Aristotelian philosophy. Felix Jacoby perceived that the first forty-one chapters of the *AP* are Aristotle's account of the development of the Athenian state toward its definitive form: "That philosopher, in accordance with the general nature of his thinking, recognized that the description of the existing form of a State [*sc.* 42–69] does not teach us anything unless it is shown at the same time how the form of the State concerned arrived at its φύσις, as one might say."[45] The *metabolai* marked way-stations in the development of democracy toward its final, radical form. The Athenian state was transformed, by these "changes," from the monarchy of Ion and Theseus, through the earlier forms of democracy, into the radical state realized first in 462 and then definitively in 403 (41.2). Teleology was thus applied to politics.

[44] Viz. man's ability to imitate action and his pleasure in such imitation: *Poet.* 1448B,4–9.

[45] *Atthis* (Oxford 1949) 212. The development of a state toward radical democracy—not a good form, according to Aristotle's conservative political philosophy—would not be called the *telos* of a state generally, since a *telos* is a desirable end or the perfected form of a creature. But not all natural evolution, according to Aristotle, leads to the *telos*. Some animals, on account of their unsuitable material, fail to achieve their *telos* and suffer deformity. For example, a certain kind of octopus was unable to develop two rows of suckers but had to make do with one, since nature was unable to locate two rows on its excessively narrow arms. The development was final and permanent but missed the *telos*: *Part. anim.* 685B, 12–16. On the other hand, Aristotle states in the *Rhetoric* (1366A, 4) that the *telos* of democracy is political liberty or *eleutheria*. Since radicalism presumably offers the most liberty to citizens, it might be held to achieve the special *telos* of democracy.

v. Conclusion.

Through circumstances beyond his control, Aristotle was unable to consult enough documentary sources in the research for his history of the Athenian constitution.   His sources, mainly fourth century historians, made no particular effort to give a coherent history of Athenian public law; and they too lacked crucial documents in any case.   To the facts available from these writers Aristotle could add a few primary sources—above all, the poems of Solon.   But he was unfortunately constrained to inference and reconstruction.   Under these difficult conditions he could not, and did not, avoid bringing his own ideas to bear on his material.   As a result, data were arranged, reformulated, and adjusted to accord with certain patterns and expectations original with Aristotle and not drawn from dispassionate inquiry into historical fact.

It is the duty of the historian to preserve and use such valuable facts and dates as Aristotle preserves, while permanently eliminating the scheme into which they are redacted.   This cannot, however, be considered a negative or barren undertaking. There is needed an approach to the *AP* that recognizes it as a work by the author of the *Politics*, the *Physics*, and the biological writings.   The distinctive methods of this philosopher will duly appear; and the *AP* will be read as a book based on and controlled by the political and metaphysical doctrines of its fertile creator.